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ABSTRACT
This document presents pertinent information regarding the evaluation
and certification of sensitive software applications in the NASA
environment. The evaluation and certification of sensitive
applications_on a periodic basis is a sound management practice and
is responsive to the requirements of OMB Circular A-71, Transmittal
Memorandum No. 1. The evaluation process includes definition of
security objectives, assessment of security feasibility, analysis of
technical specifications, and a security posture evaluation, which
includes the performance of vulnerability, threat scenario, and
safeguard analyses.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
As a part of an overall computer security effort, NASA has an
on-going program to ensure the continuity of operations and data
integrity of sensitive applications. OMB Circular A-71, Transmittai
Memorandum No. 1, requires a periodic certification of such
applications.
The purpose of this document-is to provide guidance for a Center
management evaluation and certification process which will evaluate
the adequacy of safeguards for existing sensitive applications. The
concepts presented in this report are intended to provide guidance
for initial certification as well as for the recertification of
existing sensitive applications. Recertification procedures will
essentially be the same as certification procedures, however, they
will be performed by an independent party, i.e. not the principal
user. Guidance for the certification of new application systems will
be addressed in a subsequent report. The procedures provided in this
report may be modified by the NASA Centers to conform to their
internal requirements.
Key action items for the evaluation and certification process
include:
• Identification of the Degree and Scope of Application
Sensitivity
• Definition of Computer Security Functional Requirements
• Definition of Computer Security Objectives
• Definition of Computer Security Technical Specifications
• Security Posture Evaluation
ix
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• Evaluation Report
• Certification Statement
The material presented in the safeguard evaluation sections of the
evaluation and certification process is based on information provided
in FIPS PUB 73 and FIPS PUB 65. It is recommended that the reader
obtain copies of these publications for reference.
i
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1.	 INTRODUCTION
A comprehensive computer security program includes several
complementary areas such as: ADP facility risk analysis,
personnel security, management awareness, and computer security
considerations during ADP procurements.
Another aspect of an overall computer security program is an
activity to ensure the continuity of operations and data
integrity of sensitive applications. Central to this activity
is the notion of certification for new and periodic
recertification for existing sensitive applications.
OMB Circular A-71, Transmittal Memorandum No. 1, "Security of
Federal Automated Systems," (Reference 1) contains the
requirement for certification and periodic recertification of
new and existing applications within the Federal sector. In
addition, management, instructions have been implemented
NASA-wide and have established the requirement for certification
of sensitive applications at each Center.
The purpose of this report is to present a guideline for a
Center management evaluation and certification process which
will evaluate the adequacy of safeguards for meeting the
security requirements for existing sensitive applications.
Certification action formally documents responsibility for the
adequacy of application safeguards. Recertification will
consist of identical evaluation and certification procedures
performed by an independent organization. This report will
discuss the major issues and concepts which form the basis for
an initial certification of existing sensitive applications.
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The evaluation and certification process outlined in this
doctmuent will not address the following areas:
• Personnel Security. Personnel Security will be
reviewed by a separate program under the NASA security
office. However, the security classification of
individuals associated with the sensitive application
should b(., reviewed and any inconsistencies noted and
reported to the Data Processing Installation-Computer
Security Official (DPI-CSO) and the NASA security
office.
• Physical Security. The physical security of the DPI
and terminal locations will be-addressed as part of the
DPI risk analysis.
• Operating System Security. The security of the
operating system will be separately reviewed. However,
the sensitive application evaluation should consider
password control and protection aspects.
• Privacy Act Compliance. The evaluation/certification
process described herein does not specifically respond
to the Privacy Act and controls relating to Privacy Act
compliance will be separately reviewed. However, there
may be significant overlap between this process.and the
review of a Privacy Act system to ensure adequate data
protection.
This report makes numerous reference to material in FIPS.PUB
73; FIPS PUB 65; MIZRE Technical Report (MTR)-79W00445,
An Overview of ADP Risk Analysis; and MTR-31W302,
Security Planning for Computer Applications (References 3, 4, 5,
6). It is recommended that the reader obtain copies of these
publications.
a
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The guidance provided by this report may be modified by the
NASA centers to conform to their internal procedures. The basic
concepts, however, are considered an integral part of the
evaluation and certification process and should not be
neglected.
1.1 Evaluation and Certification Action Items
The evaluation and certification process for existing sensitive
applications within NASA is illustrated in Figure 1-1. The key
action items for the evaluation and certification process
include:
1. Disvelop the Project Plan. A project plan serves as
the primary management tool in directing the evaluation
and certification process.
2. Identify the Degree and Scope of Application
Sensitivity. Review all aspects of the application to
include its attributes, features, functions, and data
types to identify the degree and scope for the
application.
3. Define Computer Security Functional Requirements. A
user statement of requirements related to computer
security is based on specific security objectives and
the extent of security control automation that is
feasible for the application. The test for
appropriateness is related-to the degree and scope of
sensitivity for the application.
4. Define Computer Security Technical Specifications. A
statement of specific functions or features the
software should exhibit to satisfy security functional
requirements. Examples include:
• password control at the record level
• control totals generated at specific points
• manual review procedures
_M
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• check digits
• edit criteria
• limit checks
5. Evaluate Existing Safeguards. Examination of an
application's vulnerabilities in conjunction with
threat scenario determination provides the basis for
security control evaluation. These analyses will
validate the adequacy of the safeguards and isolate
those instances where additional controls are
required. Additional controls are developed in a
safeguards analysis.
6. Evaluation Report. This report provides an overall
evaluation of the control posture for the application.
In addition, the report will also identify inherent
weaknesses and provide recommendations for
certification decision action..
7. Certification Statement. The certification statement
formally documents the responsibility for initial
certification of an existing application within the
scope determined by the evaluation and certification
process.
1.2 Overview of the Report
Section 2 of this document discusses evaluation and
certification management concepts.. Section 3 describes a
suggested approach for the evaluation process and Section 4
presents general criteria for certification decision action.
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2. EVALUATION AND CERTIFICATION MANAGEMENT
2.1 Roles and Responsibilities
The basis for certification management is provided through the
NASA security management functions described in NASA Appendix J,
"Computer Resources Management", N1iB 2410.1. Proposed
management roles and responsibilities in the evaluation and
certification process are defined as follows:
Center Computer Security Official (Center CSO)
• Overall responsibility for the evaluation and
certification process at the center level
• Provides assurance and guidance for performance of the
project plan
Data Processing Installation Computer Security Official
(DPI CSO)
• Works with the Application CSO in the development and
definition of security objectives and controls
• Assumes the role of an Application CSO for those
applications which have more than one primary user
Application Computer Security Official (Application CSO)
• As the-primary functional user, defines project plan
for the evaluation and certification process
• Determines the sensitivity of the application
• Works with the DPI CSO in the development and
definition of security objectives and controls
• Signs the Certification Statement
2-1
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2.2 Project Plan
The initial step in the certification management process is a
project plan. The project plan serves as a management tool in
directing the evaluation and certification process for an
existing application and as such documents the approach taken
for the evaluation process. The project plan should:
• Identify the particular application.
• Identify all baseline documentation which addresses
security issues and controls. Suggested documentation
includes:
functional requirements
design specifications
- maintenance manual
- operations manual
- user manual
- flow charts
- sample I/O documents
- management policies and procedures
• Designate roles and responsibilities of the
organizations and individuals who will compose the
evaluation and certification team. Typically these
could-include representatives from the following
organizations:
- user office
- software maintenance
- DPI operations
- audit
• Define or determine the degree and scope of sensitivity
• Identify or define the security objectives
• Describe application characteristics
- Identify application characteristics including the
size and complexity
• Provide preliminary assessment of security posture.
State the areas of emphasis including:
- greatest threats, exposures, controls, etc.
-- findings of risk analysis, audits, etc.
• Provide a schedule of events for the evaluation and
certification process
• Define support requirements and manpower
S
2-3
3. EVALUATION PROCESS
For existing systems, it may be necessary to define certain
elements implicit in the overall application, but which were not
reduced to writing in the early phases of the life cycle. These
elements are application sensitivity, security feasibility,
security objectives, and security technical requirements.
3.1 Application Sensitivity
FIPS PUB 73, Section 2.3 "Examples of Sensitive Systems",
presents six application groupings which have similar security
problems. The reader should review the description of security
concerns for these applications. Although not exhaustive, the
examples do illustrate the relationship between type of
sensitivity and security objectives. In some instances, only a
portion of an application system may be sensitive, i.e., the
application may be sensitive only under specific circumstances
or in certain operational modes. Application sensitivity may be
also confined to a subsystem. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider all aspects of the application. It is suggested that
Appendix J, Section 502, NHB 2410.1C, be reviewed for specific
NASA criteria.
3.2 Security Requirements
Verification of security requirements is based on security
feasibility and security objectives for the application as
discussed below.
3-1
3.2.1 Security Feasibility
For existing systems, it is necessary to review the extent of
automated controls implemented within the application software
or those associated with managerial or operational procedures.
Section 4.3 of MTR-81W302, Security Planning for Computer
Applications (Reference 6) provides general criteria for this
step in the evaluation process. Specific feasibility criteria
are specified in NBS FIBS PUB 73, Section 5.1, which include
computer security provision for: (1) source data accuracy, (2)
user identity verification, (3) restricted interfaces, (4)
separation of duties, and (5) facility security. If the above
criteria cannot be affirmed for the application, establishment
of viable security controls by management may not be possible.
3.2.2 Security ObJectives
Since the occurrence of an undesirable event during the
processing of an application may result in a variety of
detrimental effects, specific security objectives for the
particular application must be determined. A few of these
adverse events taken from NBS FIPS PUB 31, Section 1.3.2, are
listed below:
• Fire
• Flood
• Power Failure
• Hardware Failure
• Intrusion
• Theft
FIPS PUB 73, Section 2, describes some general categories of
security objectives and illustrates their relationship with
particular types of undesirable events.
Security objectives are identified by classifying undesirable
events in terms of the immediate effect rather than ultimate or
final effect on data associated with the application. Examples
of immediate effects of these events include:
• Modification of data
• Disclosure of data
• Unavailability of data or system services
Specific security objectives resulting from these effects are
respectively:
• Data Integrity
• Data Confidentiality
• ADP Availability
Objectives may also be classified through the analysis of
accidental or deliberate acts. Accidents and errors occur more
frequently than deliberate acts and should receive the primary
focus of attention.
It is important to remember that the implementation of a
specific control in meeting a specific objective may have an
3-3
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adverse effect on other objectives. If possible, security
objectives must be ranked or weighted for the particular
application. The determination of security objectives will also
influence the security technical specifications for safeguard
implementation as well as risk assessment performance.
3.3 Security Technical Specifications
Security technical specifications are determined by review of
the following areas:
• Application Interfaces
• Operational Procedures
• Management Considerations
	 R
• Sensitivity and Asset Value of Data Objects
• Error Tolerance f
s
Appropriate application documentation should be reviewed to
fi
assess the adequacy of technical specifications for security
controls in these areas. Suggested action items for each of
these areas are described below.
1. Application Interfaces. Identify each job component or
other automated systems that provide input data to the
application system or support its operation. Conversely,
all job components and applications that are supported by
the application system should also be identified. Review
the nature of the interaction between each application job
component. Suggested job components include:
- data collection at the-source
- data entry
- output dissemination
- application software maintenance
- documentation
- data archival storage
- operations
- outputs
- system programming
- internal reviews and audit procedures
- security planning and control procedures
2. Management Considerations. Identify and define the
separation of duties within each job component or
operational procedure as well as availability requirements
for the application. Availability requirements should
clearly establish limits on the maximum length of
interrUption for the application or its potential frequep y
of use.
3. Operational Procedures. Identify and define the
responsibilities of the individuals who interact with the
application through each interface. Constraints on use must
be identified if a certain degree of security is to be
enforced. This principle should also be applied to other
application systems which interact with the current
application. Critical operations should be identified.
4. Sensitivity of the Data Objects. Determine the sensitivity
and asset value of data objects associated with the
application. These data objects are the data as seed by the
user rather than the data processed by the application
software. Security requirements for data objects should be
validated with respect to objectives of data integrity,
confidentiality, availability, and fraud prevention.
5. Error Tolerance. Reliability and validity of the data and
the intended objectives of the applications constitute the
primary considerations in assessing the error tolerance for
the application. Requirements for maintaining potential
3-5
error levelo to within this tolerance must be addressed as
part of the security requirements.
FIPS PUB-73 (Section 3 and Section 6.1) provides a
comprehensive discussion on security controls and functional
security requirements. While these examples are not exhaustive,
those provided are sufficient to determine technical security
specifications. The precision and method of implementation of
the technical specification is influenced by the factors of
security feasibility and security objectives.
3.4 Security Posture Evaluation
For those applications where security requirements have been
adequately defined, an assessment of the security posture that
considers the application software and its data should be
performed. This assessment will include a determination of
vulnerabilities and threats. The likelihood of a threat
happening vs. the possible annual loss if it does occur will
also be determined. Safeguards will be suggested based on the
likelihood and annual loss potential. Typical vulnerabilities
pertaining to threats of
• Disasters
• Delay
• Erroneous input	 s
• Erroneous output (program errors)	 .;
• Theft	 5
• Vandalism
• Fraud
• Information Disclosure
a f
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should be considered in the assessment. FIPS PUB 65 and
MR-79W00445, An Overview of ADP Risk Analysis (Reference 5)
provides guidance in this area.
3.4.1 Vulnerability Analysis
The first step in the evaluation of controls is based primarily
on the application security objectives in conjunction with
inherent vulnerabilities. Together, the vulnerabilities and
security objectives establish the basis for the threat scenario
analysis. A vulnerability may be thought of as a 'hole' in the
line of defense against threats. It is the absence or
ineffectiveness of a safeguard. Threats will reduce a system's
integrity, confidentiality, or availability. See Figure 3-1 for
an illustration of this concept.
Although an application's vulnerability to some types of
threats may vary, certain vulnerabilities are common to most
sensitive applications. a detailed checklist for common types
of vulnerabilities may be found in the Appendix of FIPS PUB 65.
A work sheet is provided in Appendix A to help with this
analysis.
3.4.2 Threat Scenario Analysis
Threat scenarios serve to validate a security control's
effectiveness against an application's vulnerabilities and
security requirements. A threat is a circumstance which may
cause loss or harm to the system, e.g., the employment of a
3-7
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VULNERABILITY THREAT RELATIONSHIPS
convicted embezzler as a bank teller. Figure 3-1 illustrates
how threats penetrate defenses through vulnerabilities and
Figure 3-2 illustrates the effect of successful penetration.
In addition, threat scenarios also serve to isolate those
aspects of an application which lack effective safeguards.
Guidance for this evaluation technique is presented in
references 7 and 8.
An effective threat scenario analysis team is composed of
personnel who are familiar with all aspects of the applicatior.
interfaces described in Section 3.4. Not more than ten
personnel should be selected for the team. Once the team
members have been identified, the team leader should develop a
short statement that defines those application aspects which
will be considered for threat scenario analysis. The statement
should also include a list of vulnerabilities and security
objectives. A few possible or probable threats for the
application should be provided as examples and a full meeting
for the team should also be scheduled. The preliminary material
should be sent to each member of the team well in advance of the
first team meeting.
Actual threat scenario development is accomplished through a
series of informal team meetings. Each meeting should be
scheduled for a minimum of two and one-half hours. It is
recommended that at least two meetings be held. Each meeting
should begin with a discussion and review of preliminary
material or material provided from the previous meeting. Flip
charts may be used with all pages put on full display once
3-9
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THREAT EFFECTS AND SOURCES
filled. Whenever possible, the team should attempt to determine
the probability of a particular threat occurrence. However, if
a probability cannot be immediately assigned, it is desirable to
categorize the threat occurrence in general terms such as high,
medium, or low. Safeguards which counter each threat should be
developed by the team and listed for the threat.
Finally, the threats must be ranked. The ranking of threat
scenarios may be accomplished through consensus action by the
threat scenario team. See Appendix A for threat scenario
worksheets.
3.5 Safeguards Analysis.
Safeguards should be developed for the vulnerabilities listed
in the vulnerability analysis. Use the safeguards developed in
the threat scenario analysis and those developed from the
vulnerability analysis to conduct the safeguard analysis. The
safeguards should be ranked into three categories for
implementation.
• Critical - These measures reduce a serious
vulnerability to a threat. Implementation should take
place immediately to establish or maintain the proper
level of security.
• Necessary These measure reduce a less serious
vulnerability to a threat. This control should be
implemented but the need is less immediate than for
critical safeguards.
e Desirable - These measures provide extra levels of
security and are discretionary.
3-11
Figure 3-3 shows how safeguards plug "holes" in the line of
defense.
The ranking of safeguards using the above categories provides a
basis for management decisions for an implementation time
frame. A cost benefit analysis or a return on investment
determination should also be done to assist in the selection of
safeguards for implementation. A return on investment
determination is based on the difference between the expected
loss before the implementation of the.safeguard, less the
expected loss after the implementation of the safeguard, divided
by the cost of the safeguard. In many cases obtaining
quantitative data may not be feasible, and a qualitative
evaluation may be necessary. In these cases, a high, medium, or
low value may be used for these elements. After safeguards have
been ranked and benefits assessed, recommendations for
anagement decisions can be made.
.6 Evaluation Report
he primary purpose of the evaluation report is to document the
valuation and subsequent certification process for an
pplication and to serve as the basis for the certification
taiement. It also establishes the degree of confidence to be
laced in the evaluation process and its findings.
he report should accurately reflect the existing control
osture for the applications. The major portion of the findings
hould discuss the results obtained from the vulnerability,
hreat scenario, and safeguard analyses. The report will also
3-12
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SAFEGUARD EFFECTS
identify any serious application shortcomings which may require
further study such as a modification in operational procedures.
The evaluation report is maintained in the security file for the
sensitive application. A suggested outline for the evaluation
report is presented in Appendix B.
3-14
kr. ,
4. CERTIFICATION STATEMENT
The certification statement represents the final step in the
evaluation/certification process for an existing application.
The Application CSO is responsible for making the certification
decision. The decision process involves interpreting the
recommendations made in the evaluation report and in some cases,
defining controls that must be implemented in order to authorize
continued operation. The decision process may be influenced by
the operational impact of implemented safeguards or by increased
costs incurred due to restrictions imposed on the application's
functions.
Typical restrictions which may affect continued operation
include:
• Addition of procedure controls
• Separation of duties
• Restriction to process data of reduced sensitivity
• Restriction on the number of user individuals
• Removal of unauthorized access in a dial-up mode by
utilization of security software packages
• Removal of application subsystem or component functions
software
A suggested format for the certification statement is presented
in Appendix C.
4-1
APPENDIX A
THREAT SCENARIO ANALYSIS - ASSISTANCE AND CONSIDERATIONS
The following pages provide:
1. An outline for the threat team meetings.
2. Specific threat tea. ► considerations.
3. An example work sheet to help the team develop scenarios.
4. Example work sheets to help in the vulnerability, threat
scenario, and safeguard analysis.
P
A
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INITIAL THREAT TEAM MEETING
A.1.1 Agenda
• Purpose of threat teams
• Steps Involved
• War Stories
• Vulnerability Analysis
• Threat Scenario Discussion
• Determine Probability of Scenario Occurrence
• Determine Ranking of Scenario
• Wrap-up and Summary
A.1.2 Primary Meeting
• Confidential, to prevent disclosure of system
vulnerabilities
• Moderator uses flip charts to summarize as discussion
occurs
• Alternative: Each member summarizes the scenario and
turns it over to the moderator for editing
and it is also summarized on-going using a
flip chart for the group.
A.1.3 Final Meeting
• Meet again for one hour to go over transcript or
write-up and inject second thoughts.
A-2
A.2 SPECIFIC THREAT TEAM CONSIDERATIONS
A.2.1 Team Member Requirements
• Knowledge of the System
• Confidence and personal security to allow the
individual to participate without fear
• Imagination
• Outgoing personality
A.2.2 Avoid These Members
• Managers with a general overall responsibility who have
little day to day contact with the specifics of the
operational system.
• Persons new in their job
• Security Officers
A.2.3 Overall Considerations
• No more than 10 members for a team
• 2 to 2' hour primary session
A.2.4 Advantage of the Threat Team Approach
• Realistic practical vulnerabilities
• Low cost
• Management awareness and interest
• Employee's willingness to participate (gaming)
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well
• Accepted by management
• Provides a basis for testing controls
A.2.5 Disadvantages
• Secrecy required (exposes weaknesses)
• Skilled leader required
• Not always methodical
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EXAMPLE OF COMPLETED THREAT SCENARIO WORK SHEET
A.7 THREAT SCENARIO WORK SHEET
1. What to attacked or compromised in the system?
//	
` ^"
d/lt Grpt1c)1.^^L^- Jr^ ,Q4 i/2LL'L"a-f c Gtr ^,^.r-z^,z.v.
2. What vulnerabilities allow the attack?
.^^ c`' _^„^.aci.-e-t.^t:^ • fist. ^^ ^z.,:z/cz.c^c.
v^' r.in.. !, 4°ti^a^zL^: ,cr^%Z'ic^u•k ^^Le:Gl^:•Lc^i^ ik^'"^`^' tLLLC.z44.3. What methods could be used?
to
4. What safeguards or controla can prevent the loss?
^LI^G,•^l^/I^^LCY1	 :2. O	 L'!^.*-;C ,cl^•c:G!/L^
GKG cZ^C ^l^'Il.	 ^CP.4 ^L •21g^^G
Dj^^GL'ILCL Q,ule.
5. What
`
 is the likelihood that this scenario will work?
(High, medium or Low)
VVI k
6. What is the Impact on the assets if it does work?
(Order of magnitude in dollars, i.e.. tens, hundreds,
thousands, etc.)
^/,ocoK
Reprodu=ed from
best available copy.
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Vulnerability Safeguard Summary
l L' av4
Vulnerabilities
(A brief descripti
wZi aie^u^l^^
c A .CG^s.^. 1/Cl.^
2. c^, a.oa^^z►-coL.^
3. ^on^amylczc. ^u2u-
ijZ^n ra^^t' c^ .^.aot ^(.
Proposed Safeguards
Pi—la,^YfoUaCuz.0
Cost Benefit
or Level of
Priority of	 Return on
Safeguards
	 Investment
1.
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Threat Scenario Bulernability
Sumary
Scenarios	 Existing vulnerabilities
(A brief description)	 which my be exploited
Possible
loss
per year I Likelihood I Rankin
t,VA4LPk..
2n.^	 1c71Z^cc. ^
^c^Lc
^ttl /LCC^^'!c^^
^tdmr tag4
Piucf ct,cc^-s
Sc'
t „zccz t l 6
^/^ . Mara..
C.'ha^^ c'G?'1t2e^LQ
.rl"Vel rau:/ 2
I ^/O K A4e^A 12
J'S,r 1 ,74-rx-	 3
I
Reproduced from	 MOMM
best available copy.
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Threat Scenario Safeguard Sua,ary
Cost Benefit
or Level
Priority of of Return on
Safeguards I Investment
Scenarios
(A brief description) Proposed Safeguards
07 t a.
'^tCC.• .d^tcctict^1
ZZ
0^,^
4c a	 ,^
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APPENDIX B
SUGGESTED EVALUATION REPORT OUTLINE
1. Executive Summary
2. Introduction/Background
3. Evaluation Process
3.1 Feasibility Assessment
3.2 Security Objectives
3.3 Security Specifications
3.4 Security Posture Evaluation
3.4.1 Existing Control Posture
3.4.2 Vulnerabilities
3.4.3 Threat Scenario Analysis
3.4.4 Safeguards Analysis
4. ;!tecommendations
Attachment A: Project Plan
Attachment B: Proposed Certification Statement
Attachment C: Threat Scenario Reports
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APPENDIX C
PROPOSED CERTIFICATION STATEMENT FORMAT
Based on the evaluation of (Sensitive Application) dated
(Evaluation Report Date), the security safeguards are deemed
adequate for the application with restrictions or clarifications
noted below, and to the best of my knowledge, meet all
applicable federal policies, regulations, and standards.
Signature	 Date
(Application CSO)
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